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ABSTRACT
Open-source software licensing has become mainstream in
the field of software development. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the 2008 Federal Circuit decision Jacobsen v.
Katzer, where the court first interpreted the terms of an opensource software license. The Jacobsen decision offers an
important first step in how to interpret the terms of an opensource license, though it does not address how to interpret
licenses other than the Artistic License. This Article explores
how Jacobsen’s reasoning can be used to interpret the terms
of other open-source licenses, particularly the GPL v.2, GPL
v.3, Apache License v.2, BSD License, and the Mozilla Public
License. After examining the Federal Circuit’s discussion of
“conditions” and “covenants,” this Article suggests how to
draw a principled distinction between these terms when
interpreting an open-source license. This Article also
*

Yamini Menon, Johns Hopkins University, B.A. 1998; American University –
Washington College of Law, J.D. 2003; University of Washington School of Law,
LLM 2010. A special thanks to Professor Robert W. Gomulkiewicz for his
feedback, guidance, and advice throughout the writing process. I extend my deepest
gratitude to my parents, Unni & Usha Menon, to my sister, Yamuna Menon, and to
my husband Ashesh Bakshi. Thank you to Signe Naeve and the staff of the
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts for their efforts and feedback in
preparing this Article for publication.

312

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [Vol. 6:4

examines policy considerations that arise when interpreting
the terms of an open-source license and offers proposals for
reducing exposure to potential copyright infringement
liability when using software licensed under an open-source
software license.
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INTRODUCTION
While software developers have been sharing code since the first
days of the software industry, they did not begin using open-source
licenses to produce collaborative works until the late 1990s. 1 Since
then, open-source licensing has become mainstream in the field of
software development.2 Open-source licensing even remains relevant
for those who prefer proprietary licensing to open-source licensing.
Large players in the software industry (e.g., Novell, Sun, IBM, Cisco,
and Microsoft) either offer or support these licenses.3 Even those who
do not use open-source licenses may become exposed to them
through third-party vendors. 4 Understanding the legal implications of
using open-source software is therefore vital, even in professions that
do not involve writing and developing code. 5
These implications are evident in the recent Federal Circuit
decision Jacobsen v. Katzer, 6 in which the Federal Circuit issued the
first judicial decision to address remedies available to a litigant when
a defendant has violated the terms of an open-source software
license. 7 In Jacobsen, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that breaching the terms of an
open-source license (in this case, the Artistic License) did not rise to
the level of copyright infringement. 8 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision and found such a breach
nonetheless limits the scope of the license, even without purely
1

See Amanda Albrecht Earl, Case Note, Copyright Infringement And Open
Source Public Licenses: Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 77 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1605, 1605 (2009).
2
ALAN STERN & A. CLIFFORD ALLEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING, 985 Prac. L.
Inst. 321, 327 (PLI 2009).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See id. (explaining that the consequences of ignorance or apathy about open
source licenses include bad publicity, litigation, and being outmaneuvered by
competitors, among other things).
6
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373,(Fed. Cir. 2008).
7
DENIS T. RICE, DEVELOPMENTS IN LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES, 984 Prac. L. Inst. 605, 616 (PLI 2009).
8
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 2007 WL 2358628 (N.D. Cal. 2007), vacated in part,
535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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economic harm arising from a breach of the conditions in an opensource license. 9 The court held that exceeding the scope of an opensource license constitutes copyright infringement. 10
Although the open-source community heralded the Jacobsen
decision for providing legal legitimacy for open-source licenses,11 the
case still left several unanswered questions. First, how does Jacobsen
apply to open-sources licenses other than the Artistic License?
Second, because the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jacobsen hinges on
the distinction between “conditions” and “covenants” in an opensource license, how is this distinction drawn when interpreting the
language of an open-source license?
This Article attempts to answer these questions by examining how
Jacobsen applies to open-source licenses including the GPL v.2, GPL
v.3, Apache License v.2, BSD License, and the Mozilla License. Part
I summarizes the Jacobsen decision and highlights several gaps in its
reasoning. Part II provides an overview of the open-source licenses
that will be examined through the lens of Jacobsen. Part III attempts
to fill the gaps left by the Jacobsen decision by offering a principled
distinction between conditions and covenants when reading the
language of an open-source license. By using this distinction to
interpret the language of the various open-source licenses listed
above, this Article will provide guidance to attorneys, software
developers, and anyone else who may be affected by the use of opensource code. It will also illustrate how the Federal Circuit’s reasoning
can be extended to licenses other than the Artistic License litigated in
Jacobsen and will offer proposals to help avoid potential copyright
infringement liability pursuant to Jacobsen.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF JACOBSEN V. KATZER
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The story behind Jacobsen is a familiar one in the open-source
9

Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382; see also Earl, supra note 1, at 1606.
Earl, supra note 1, at 1606.
11
See id. at 1624 (noting that the Jacobsen decision was a victory for open
source advocates because the Artistic License, which is viewed as being broad and
vague, was found enforceable under copyright law).
10
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community. The plaintiff, Robert Jacobsen, and the defendant,
Matthew Katzer, had each developed competing open-source
software applications to control model trains. 12 Jacobsen and his
open-source group, Java Model Railroad Interface Project (JMRI),
developed the Decoder Pro application and licensed it under an opensource license (the Artistic License) that contained a number of
preconditions for use. 13 Matthew Katzer and his company sold
Decoder Commander. 14
Katzer had obtained a patent for Decoder Commander in March
2005 and then accused Jacobsen of infringing his patent for Decoder
Commander. 15 Jacobsen responded by filing a complaint for
declaratory judgment, seeking a finding of non-infringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability of Katzer’s patent. 16
While preparing his complaint for declaratory judgment, Jacobsen
discovered that there were similarities between the code contained in
his Decoder Pro software and the code contained in Katzer’s Decoder
Commander software.17 Jacobsen also realized that Katzer had used
portions of the open-source Decoder Pro code in Decoder
Commander, but had failed to adhere to the requirements of the
Artistic License. 18 Under the terms of this license, a user had to
comply with certain preconditions before redistributing or modifying
the software.19 One of these conditions required that the downstream
user keep the author’s name and describe or disclose any changes
made to the software program. 20
Jacobsen amended his complaint for declaratory judgment to
12

See PAUL H. ARNE, JACOBSEN V. KATZER: OPEN SOURCE LICENSE
VALIDATION – HOW FAR DOES IT GO?, 961 Prac. L. Inst. 133, 137 (PLI 2009).
13
See Hersh R. Reddy, Note, Jacobsen v. Katzer: The Federal Circuit Weighs
In On The Enforceability Of Free And Open Source Software Licenses, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 299, 314-15 (2009).
14
Earl, supra note 1, at 1614.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. Jacobsen learned that the Decoder Commander files did not contain any
reference to the authors’ names, the JMRI copyright notices were not referenced in
the “COPYING” file or the original source location of the file, and the files did not
keep track of the changes made from JMRI’s original source code.
19
Reddy, supra note 13, at 315.
20
Id.
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include copyright infringement and filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Katzer from distributing Decoder
Commander. 21 Interestingly, Katzer later admitted to copying
portions of the Decoder Pro software. 22
The district court denied and dismissed Jacobsen’s motion for a
preliminary injunction on the basis that Katzer’s use of portions of
Jacobsen’s source code in Decoder Commander did not rise to the
level of copyright infringement, but merely constituted a violation of
Jacobsen’s contractual right.23 According to the district court, the
only way Jacobsen could establish that Katzer’s copying constituted
copyright infringement was to show that Katzer had exceeded the
scope of the Artistic License. 24 The court found that Katzer’s actions
were within the scope of the Artistic License under its interpretation
of the license terms. 25 Consequently, the district court held that
Katzer had not committed copyright infringement. 26
In its reasoning, the court found that the scope of the license was
intentionally broad and that the attribution requirement did not limit
the scope of the license. 27 The court further held that an alleged
violation of the license conditions may constitute a breach of the
license, but that does not create liability for copyright infringement
where it would not otherwise exist. 28 Therefore, the court interpreted
the restrictions contained in the Artistic License as covenants rather
than as preconditions. 29 Thus, Jacobsen needed to pursue a cause of
action for breach of contract,30 not for copyright infringement. 31 But
in order to obtain a preliminary injunction pursuant to a contract law
theory, Jacobsen needed to demonstrate both a likelihood of success
on the merits of the case (i.e., prove every element of a contract and a

21

Earl, supra note 1, at 1614.
Id.
23
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 2007 WL 2358628 at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *7.
30
Id.
31
Id.
22
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breach thereof) and irreparable harm. 32 Because the court had found
that Katzer’s use did not exceed the scope of the Artistic License, it
held that Jacobsen had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits and was not entitled to the presumption of irreparable
harm. 33 Consequently, the court denied Jacobsen’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, resulting in Jacobsen’s appeal to the Federal
Circuit. 34
When the Federal Circuit decided the Jacobsen appeal, it became
the first court to recognize and support the terms of an open-source
license. 35 The court’s decision turned on whether the terms of the
Artistic License were conditions of the license subject to copyright
protection or covenants subject to contract remedies. 36 In its
reasoning, the Federal Circuit expressly stated that if the terms of the
Artistic License were both covenants and conditions, then this would
limit the scope of the license and copyright law would apply; if,
however, the terms were only covenants, contract law would apply
exclusively. 37
The Federal Circuit never actually explained the difference
between conditions and covenants in its opinion. Instead, the court
simply pointed to the language of the Artistic License. 38 The court
concluded that taken at face value, the language of the Artistic
License creates conditions. 39 Relying on the Preamble as well as
Section Three of the Artistic License, the court noted that the intent
of the license was to state the conditions under which it is permissible
to copy a software package. 40 Moreover, the court noted that users
have certain rights “provided that” they adhere to the stated
32

See id. at *5.
A breach of contract does not carry with it a presumption of irreparable
harm, but rather requires separate proof of irreparable harm. See Earl, supra note 1,
at 1615.
34
Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *7; see also Earl, supra note 1, at 1615.
35
ARNE, supra note 12, at 141.
36
See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1381.
39
See id. (relying on the language of the Artistic License stating that “[t]he
intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a Package may be
copied.”).
40
Id. at 1381.
33
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conditions. 41
The court cited only one California Supreme Court case,
Diepenbrock v. Luiz, in support of its proposition that the language of
the Artistic License created a condition and not merely a covenant. 42
The court noted that under California contract law, the words
“provided that” traditionally denote the existence of a condition. 43
Therefore, the court found that the Artistic License used “the
traditional language of conditions by noting that the rights to copy,
modify, and distribute are granted ‘provided that’ the conditions are
met.” 44
In February 2010, Jacobsen and Katzer settled the litigation by
agreeing to an injunction. 45 Now that the Jacobsen case has ended,
the far-reaching implications of the decision are becoming apparent
to the open-source community.
B. The Implications of Jacobsen
While the Federal Circuit decision provides limited guidance on
how one should interpret the terms of an open-source license, the
decision raises more questions than it answered. For instance, the
court indicated that the distinction between a condition and a
covenant is what determines whether or not copyright infringement
liability will attach when someone violates the language of an opensource license. 46 However, the Federal Circuit did not provide much
guidance as to how to make such a distinction.
In making this determination, should courts look at the intent of
41

Id. Although the Federal Circuit stated that users retain the rights to copy,
modify, and distribute the software “provided that” they adhere to certain
conditions listed in the Artistic License, the court did not specifically list or explain
these conditions.
42
Id. (citing Diepenbrock v. Luiz, 115 P. 743 (1911)).
43
See id. Interestingly, Diepenbrock is not a contract case, but a real property
case involving the interpretation of language contained in a lease. See Diepenbrock,
115 P. at 743.
44
Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381.
45
See Posting of Andy Updegrove to The Standards Blog, A Big Victory for
F/OSS: Jacobsen v. Katzer is Settled, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/
standardsblog/article.php?story=201002190850472 (Feb. 19, 2010, 09:45 PST)..
46
See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381.
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the parties as courts normally do when interpreting a contract?47
Should the courts permit drafters of an open-source license to choose
whether their license provisions are conditions or covenants? 48 If so,
what “magic words” should drafters of open-source licenses
incorporate to ensure the terms are enforceable? One key issue is
whether it is appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to allow
drafters the freedom to craft license language in such a way as to
change a covenant into a condition to hold parties liable for copyright
infringement. 49 It other words, is it permissible to use contract law to
create a cause of action for copyright infringement that otherwise
would not exist? While the traditional notion of freedom of contract
allows for this, the opposing view is that only conditions touching
upon the exclusive rights explicitly provided under copyright law
should qualify as license conditions. 50
Before attempting to answer these questions left open by
Jacobsen, it is important to provide some background on the
spectrum of existing open-source licenses that will be at issue going
forward.
II. OVERVIEW OF OPEN-SOURCE LICENSES TO WHICH JACOBSEN
WILL BE APPLIED
This section examines five representative open-source software
licenses of the sixty-plus licenses certified by the Open Source
Initiative (OSI): General Public License (GPL) versions 2 and 3,
Apache License version 2, Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD)
License, and the Mozilla License. 51
A. GPL v.2
47

See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License
Contracts: Tales From a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
335, 356 (2009).
48
See id. at 351.
49
See id. at 353-54.
50
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 47, at 354.
51
Open
Source
Initiative,
Licenses
By
Name,
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/alphabetical (last visited Apr. 29, 2011); see
also STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 333.
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The GNU GPL may be the most common free open-source
license. 52 Version 2 of the GPL (GPL v.2) appeared in 1991 and is
the license that governs the Linux kernel. 53 It is also one of the most
controversial licenses because of its “strong copyleft” terms and the
debate over how these terms apply in specific cases. 54 The “strong
copyleft” terms of GPL v.2 state that when a user distributes the
original software, he or she must also license the “work as a whole”
under those same terms. 55
While it is evident what is meant by “work as a whole” in some
contexts, it is unclear how one can satisfy this requirement in the
context of software when most software applications interact with
other programs, libraries, drivers, and components of operating
systems as a routine way of functioning. 56 Thus, there is much debate
over where to draw the line with respect to this requirement. 57
Federal copyright law regarding derivative works is an important
consideration and makes drawing this line even more difficult in the
context of computer software.58
GPL v.2 addresses the “work as a whole” issue by indicating that
the aggregation of two works in the same medium for the purposes of
distribution does not trigger the provision named above. 59 It states
that this provision does not affect an independent and separate work
that does not derive from original software code when that work is
distributed as a separate work.60 The license further states that the
intent of the license drafter was merely to control distribution of
“derivative or collective works based on the [original software].”61
Finally, GPL v.2 states that the intent of the drafters is merely to
52

RICE, supra note 7, at 615.
STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 350.
54
Id.
55
GNU Operating System, What Is Copyleft, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/
(last visited Apr. 29, 2011) (arguing that the licensing of all copyrights, along with
the requirement that others do the same, is generally viewed as making the license a
“copyleft” license); see also STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 350-51.
56
STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 350-51.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 351.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
53
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control the distribution of “derivative or collective works based on
the [original software].” 62
Unfortunately, no American court has yet to interpret the
substantive terms of the GPL v.2, which has resulted in debates about
its terms among attorneys, software engineers, and the Free Software
Foundation (FSF). 63 With no bright-line rule available for
interpreting the terms of the GPL v.2, companies and the open-source
community have developed their own norms and interpretations.64 To
further complicate matters, the question of the enforceability of
copyleft provisions under the copyright laws of various jurisdictions
also remains unclear. 65 Copyright law provides copyright holders the
legal right to prevent others from using their program except by
complying with the copyright holders’ license terms. 66 However, an
action under copyright law can also raise enforceability issues
regarding strong copyleft provisions that try to supersede the
copyright ownership of works linked to the copyleft work.67 Thus,
these aspects of the GPL v.2 can make interpreting the terms of this
license challenging.
B. GPL v.3
Version 3 of the GPL (GPL v.3) was released on June 29, 2007,
after a lengthy period of drafting and discussion. 68 Since its release,
62

STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 350-51.
Id.
64
For example, Linus Torvalds (the software engineer best known for the
development of the Linux kernel operating system) has stated that he does not
believe that the so called “viral effects” of GPL v.2 extend to the applications that
run on top of Linux, but rather that these applications are considered separate works
that are untainted by the copyleft requirement of GPL v.2 if they access the Linux
operating system’s functions using its own standard interfaces. Torvalds’
interpretation may be considered dispositive with respect to GPL software that he
owns and may even be persuasive vis-à-vis other Linux components (such as the
Linux kernel), but it is still unclear whether this interpretation applies to other code
licenses under GPL v.2. Id.
65
Id. at 351-52.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 352.
68
Brett Smith, A Quick Guide to GPL v3, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM,
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.pdf; STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2,
63
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thousands of open-source projects have adopted this version of the
license. 69 GPL v.3 was drafted with the goal of addressing some of
the areas that GPL v.2 had failed to address, such as patent
indemnity, internationalization, and remedies for inadvertent license
infringement. 70 The newer version of the license (drafted by Richard
Stallman of the FSF and Eben Moglen of the Software Freedom
Centre) reflects the drafting process that led to its creation — a
“broad, consensus-driven process” that involved seeking feedback
from four separate committees and broad comment from the public
during the course of an eighteen month period. 71 The purpose behind
GPL v.3, however, is the same as that of GPL v.2 — to “ensure the
preservation of users’ freedom to ‘run, copy, distribute, study, change
and improve the software.’” 72 Although this newest version of the
GPL adds some new features and resolves some of the ambiguities
contained in the previous version, the ambiguity surrounding the
copyleft provisions of the license remains unresolved.
The GPL v.3 contains an “internationalization” provision, which
reflects a change in terminology found in the GPL v.3. 73 Previously,
critics claimed that the language contained in GPL v.2 as having too
much of an American focus rather than an international one. 74
Consequently, the drafters of GPL v.3 changed the phrasing to reflect
a more neutral approach, as seen in the use of terms such as
“propagate” and “convey,” rather than “copy” and “distribute.”75
Although GPL v.3 defines these terms in more detail, it still refers to
very broad copyright ideas that many people believe are still too
vague to apply to software code. 76 Also, different countries may still
reach other conclusions as to what comprises a derivative work of a
at 354.
69

STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 354.
Liz Laffan, GPL v2 vs. GPL v3: The Two Seminal Open Source Licenses:
Their Roots, Consequences, and Repercussions - Analysing, Understanding, and
Interpreting the GPL v2 and GPL v3 Licenses, VISION MOBILE (2007),
www.linuxfordevices.com/files/misc/GPLv2_vs_GPLv3.pdf.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 4.
73
See STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 354.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 354.
70
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copyleft software program and whether or not the terms contained in
GPL v.3 apply to works that are not derivative works. 77
There are three features of GPL v.3 in particular that have caused
controversy. The first is the patent provision. 78 Unlike GPL v.2, GPL
v.3 contains a clear and explicit royalty-free patent grant from all
contributors to the software code under all “essential patent claims”
that are owned or controlled by the contributor. 79 The license also
prohibits attempts at controlling downstream distribution through a
discriminatory patent license. 80 While there may be general
agreement that the adoption of an express patent grant provision is
beneficial to those who use software covered by GPL v.3, there is still
much debate regarding the specific wording used for the patent
grant. 81 Some feel that the wording is too broad because it covers
future patents that may be filed or invented with respect to an area of
technology similar to that which a user contributes or licenses under
GPL v.3. 82 In addition, the use of the phrase “knowingly rely” in the
patent grant has sparked several controversies. 83
A second feature of GPL v.3 that has caused debate is the section
of the license entitled “Protecting Users’ Legal Rights From AntiCircumvention Law,” 84 which is a section of the license that intends
to prevent code distributed under GPL v.3 from being included in
technology or products that would be used to enforce the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 85 This provision restrains the
type of product in which the software code can be used, which many
believe is not appropriate for free and open-source software (FOSS)
77

Id. at 354-55.
Laffan, supra note 70, at 8.
79
STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 355.
80
Id.
81
Laffan, supra note 70, at 8.
82
See id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. The DMCA makes it a crime to produce and disseminate technology,
devices, or services that are used to circumvent processes that control access to
copyrighted materials. Id. This is known as “Digital Rights Management,” (DRM),
which refers to access control technologies that can be used to impose limits and
restrictions on the usage of digital content and devices). See Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Digital Rights Management, www.eff.org/isues/drm (last visited Apr.
29, 2011).
78
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licensing. 86 When someone distributes code under the terms of GPL
v.3, this waives the right to enforce any legal remedy under the
DMCA and any other laws that implements Article 11 of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaty. 87 Thus, it
is impracticable to use code covered under GPL v.3 as part of any
digital rights management mechanism. 88
The third controversial feature of GPL v.3 is the “TiVoisation”
feature, which refers to a feature contained in TiVo, a digital video
recorder and consumer device that enables consumers to record
multiple television programs at once and view them later. 89 TiVo
runs a small Linux operating system licensed under GPL v.2, and
under that license, hardware manufacturers are required to disclose
the source code to other users. 90 While TiVo makes the source code
available to other users and users are able to alter and compile the
source code licensed under GPL v.2, modified software will not run
because a special mechanism in the Tivo device shuts down the
system when it detects changes to the code.91
Thus, while TiVo technically adheres to the requirements of GPL
v.2, it violates the four freedoms established by the FSF. 92 In order to
address this circumvention by TiVo, GPL v.3 includes new terms and
obligations that are “intended to ensure that entities using GPL v.3
licensed software for any user product also provide any and all
additional information necessary to ensure installation and running of
the software.” 93 These new terms and conditions are especially
significant since know-how contained in the installation methods may
provide value to the entity that uses the GPL v.3 licensed software. 94
In addition, if a user or third party has the ability to update software
licensed under GPL v.3 that is stored in ROM, this triggers the
obligation to provide source code. 95
86

Id.
STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 355.
88
See id.; see also Laffan, supra note 70, at 8.
89
See Laffan, supra note 70 at 8-9.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 8.
92
Id. at 8-9.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
87
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C. Apache 2.0
The Apache License was adopted by the Apache Software
Foundation in January 2004 and favors a model of software
development that is centrally managed, where many contributors
provide improvements to the software code directly to the original
licensor. 96 The Apache License requires users to maintain the
copyright notice and disclaimer, but is not necessarily a copyleft
license. 97 This is because although a contribution that is deliberately
submitted to the original licensor is presumed to be licensed under the
same license terms as the original code, a contributor can overcome
the presumption by stating different terms. 98 The license also permits
users to use source code for developing both closed-source software
projects as well as open-source software projects. 99
Like other open-source licenses, the Apache License allows users
to use the software for any purpose, including distribution,
modification, or distribution of modified versions of the software
under the license terms. 100 Users need not distribute modified
versions of the software using the same license, but all license files
must retain any original patent, copyright, trademark, or attribution
notices in the redistributed code.101 The license also contains an
express patent grant and a patent peace provision. 102 In addition,
while a licensee may distribute a derivative work under different
license terms, a copy of the Apache License must be included every
time a work is distributed. 103 Moreover, the licensee must describe
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STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 348.
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See OSS Watch – Open Source Software Advisory Service, The Apache
License (v2) – An Overview, www.oss-watch.ac.uk/resources/apache2.xml (last
visited Apr. 29, 2011).
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See id.
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See id.
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The license contains a provision stating that the grant of patent rights is
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infringements of the covered software. Id.
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See STERN & ALLEN, supra note 2, at 349.
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any modifications made to the code with a notice. 104

D. Berkeley Software Distribution
The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) group of licenses grew
out of a 1970’s movement at the University of California at Berkeley,
where a group of computer programmers developed a version of the
Unix operating system. 105 This led to the creation of software known
as the Berkeley Software Distribution of Unix or BSD Unix, as well
as several variants. 106
The ideas that led to BSD Unix were similar to the ideas of the
FSF. 107 For example, BSD Unix made source code readily available
and permitted programmers to make derivative works to fix bugs and
improve the software, although there was no formal requirement for
doing so. 108 Berkeley charged a small fee intended to cover the cost
of copying the source code to a medium that licensees could use. 109
As the software program became more popular, a short and simple
version of a license was created that enabled licensees to work with
the source code and to make derivative works. 110
BSD Licenses are a group of licenses that grew from the original
license created by Bill Joy (a well-regarded programmer who later
co-founded Sun Microsystems) when he developed Unix. 111 In
contrast to the GPL Licenses, these licenses are not copyleft
licenses. 112 In fact, they are among the least restrictive open-source
software licenses. 113
For derivative works, the BSD Licenses permit, but do not
104

Id. These modifications need not be made available in source form,
however.
105
See Dennis M. Kennedy, A Primer on Open Source Licensing Legal Issues:
Copyright, Copyleft and Copyfuture, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 345, 351 (2001).
106
Id. at 352.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 351-52.
112
See Kennedy, supra note 105, at 352.
113
Id. at 363.

2011]

Law, Technology & Arts Group Feature Article

327

require, distribution of source code.114 This makes it possible to
combine programs under the BSD Licenses with proprietary
software. 115 Examples of code that users have distributed under BSD
licenses include commercial software found in Windows NT and the
Macintosh operating system, OS X. 116
The BSD Licenses are much simpler in language and style than
typical commercial software licenses and permit distribution and use
of source and object code, either with or without modification.117 The
redistribution of source code, however, must retain the required
copyright and other notices, the disclaimer of warranties, and the
limitation of liability clauses. 118 Many consider the BSD Licenses to
be much more “free” than the GPL License because they allow
developers to release derivative works under any license they want
(including licenses that contain different terms than the BSD Licenses
that applies to the original code).119
As a result of this freedom, commercial developers of software
code are more apt to use the BSD Licenses. 120 The BSD Licenses are
a good illustration of the fact that open-source licenses do not need to
be copyleft in nature to qualify under the definition of open-source.121
E. Mozilla Public License
The Mozilla Public License (MPL) is sponsored by the Mozilla
foundation and is most commonly known as the license for the
Firefox web browser. 122 As with the Apache License, the drafters of
the MPL intended to create a community model of software
development. 123 The MPL contains a copyleft provision that requires
all modifications to Mozilla source files be made available in source
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116
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See Kennedy, supra note 105, at 364.
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See id. at 365.
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See Kennedy, supra note 105, at 365.
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code form under the same license. 124 One can avoid this requirement,
however, by placing modifications to software in separate files,
which has caused some people to describe the MPL as a “weak
copyleft” license. 125 Moreover, the language of the MPL states that
Mozilla files may be combined with non-Mozilla files to create larger
works.126
The MPL also contains a grant by the original author of the code
and separate sections granting similar rights by subsequent
contributors, explicit patent grants, and a patent peace provision. 127
The patent peace provision is a complex provision that comes into
effect when a licensee makes a claim against any contributor to the
code (even if the claims are not related to the software), but the
revocation is limited to the patent grants of contributors named in the
patent action. 128 The licensee’s patent grant may also be revoked
retroactively. 129 Also, a licensee may distribute executable versions
of the code under different license terms, and modifications to the
code must be described in a file distributed with the code.130
Each derivative work must include a “LEGAL” file describing
any known intellectual property claims to the code, any known
patents required to implement an application programming interface
(API) that includes the code, and any statutes, regulations, or orders
which prohibit full compliance with the license. 131 Due to the
difficulty in complying with this latter provision, many licensees do
not adhere to its requirements. 132
Many view the MPL as a model for open-source licensing of
commercial software entities because it appears and reads like a
standard commercial software license. 133 This is because the license
drafters solicited external comments, including comments from
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attorneys, as part of the drafting process. 134 The MPL is also a model
for future releases of commercial software into open-source. 135 The
MPL is now in the process of undergoing a revision and is once again
open for public comment as part of the revision process. 136
III. APPLYING JACOBSEN TO OPEN-SOURCE LICENSES
A. Defining “Condition” versus “Covenant”
As previously noted, the Federal Circuit’s decision in the
Jacobsen case turns primarily on the interpretation of the open-source
license terms as “conditions” or as “covenants.” The Jacobsen court
interpreted the terms of the Artistic License and reached the
conclusion that the terms of the license were in fact conditions and
not covenants. This distinction between conditions and covenants is
important because if a court interprets the terms of an open-source
license to be conditions, then a licensee who violates such conditions
can be held liable for copyright infringement. To the contrary, if a
court interprets the license terms to be covenants, a licensee cannot be
held liable for copyright infringement under Jacobsen.
In applying Jacobsen to other open-source licenses, the first step
is to define what constitutes a condition and what constitutes a
covenant. Since the Federal Circuit did not define either term or
provide any guidance as to how to draw the distinction, lawyers and
open-source scholars are now left trying to find a principled way to
differentiate between covenants and conditions. As implied by the
Federal Circuit opinion in Jacobsen, the best way to do this is to look
at the law of contracts. 137
As a preliminary matter, there is some debate as to whether opensource licenses are contracts.138 Nevertheless most scholars assert
134
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that such licenses should be treated as contracts, despite arguably
lacking consideration. 139
Although an examination of whether open-source licenses are
contracts is outside the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
Professor Hillman and Dean O’Rourke have provided compelling
reasons to support their argument that open-source licenses are in fact
contracts. 140 They suggest that contract and intellectual property law
work well together in supporting the FOSS model and provide a
useful source of remedies for failing to comply with a license. 141
This argument not only supports the view of those in the opensource movement who wish to have the remedy of injunctive relief
available at their disposal when an open-source license is violated,
but also dovetails with the Federal Circuit’s own reasoning in
Jacobsen. The Federal Circuit was very clear in Jacobsen that its
interpretation of the terms contained in the Artistic License was based
on state contract law. 142 Moreover, Hillman and O’Rourke also
believe that contract law is the best source of law to accurately
determine whether a contractual provision is a pure condition or
merely a promise. 143 Therefore, this Article will define condition and
covenant and draw the distinction between these two terms by
looking at several contract law treatises and the state common law of
contracts.
Although several contract law scholars have defined condition
and covenants lightly differently in their treatises, the meaning of
these terms is relatively uniform. For instance, Professor Corbin
Eben Moglen, the attorney for the FSF, has argued that GPL v.2 is not a contract
because: (1) the term “license” denotes a specific technical meaning in property law
that denotes unilateral permission to use someone else’s property, whereas a
“contract” is an exchange of obligations (i.e., either promises for promises or
promises of future performance for present performance or payment); and (2)
Richard Stallman has provided policy reasons why FSF prefers that copyright law
govern GPL rather than contract law. Id.
139
For example, Professor Robert A. Hillman of Cornell Law School and Dean
Maureen A. O’Rourke of Boston University School of Law have each asserted that
despite the lack of consideration in open-source licenses, this should not prevent
these licenses from being treated as contracts. Id.
140
Id. at 328-35.
141
Id. at 333.
142
See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381.
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defines the term “condition” as:
[A]n “operative” fact or event. This means that it is a fact or
event that affects legal relations; it is a cause of some change
in those legal relations. To say that the fact or event is a cause
(or condition) of the change does not mean that it is the sole
cause (or condition). It is merely one of the group of factors
that is necessary to produce the change. 144
Another renowned contract law scholar defines condition as:
[A]n act or event, other than a lapse of time, that, unless
excused, must occur before a duty to perform a contractual
promise arises (condition precedent), or that discharges a duty
of performance that has already arisen (condition subsequent).
This definition covers both conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent and suggests the basis for distinction. It
also retains the idea that the duty of performance is
affected. 145
It is thus clear that a condition is “an event that must occur before
performance of a contractual duty becomes due” and “[i]n general, a
party whose duty is conditioned on such an event is not required to
perform unless the event has occurred.”146 Moreover, this explanation
is also consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
states that a condition is “an event, not certain to occur, which must
occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance
under a contract is due.” 147
On the other hand, a “covenant” is defined as a “promise,” and its
legal consequences are very different from those of a condition:

144

CATHERINE M.A. MC CAULIFF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONDITIONS, 10
(Joseph M. Perillo, ed., LEXIS Law Publishing 1999).
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While failure to perform a promise, unless excused, is a
breach, failure to comply with an express condition is not a
breach . . . . One cannot be liable for breach of contract unless
one breaches a promise . . . . Often, however, it is difficult to
interpret whether particular language creates a promise or a
condition. It is a matter of the intention of the parties, and all
the rules of contract interpretation apply . . . . In a borderline
case, the courts prefer the interpretation that particular
language creates a promise rather a condition. 148
Contract scholars have also offered guidance on how to
distinguish between a condition and a covenant. These scholars offer
an approach whereby one first asks whether the expression was
intended to be an assurance by Party A to Party B that Party A would
render some performance in the future that Party B could rely on. If
this is the case, then the expression is a promise that the specified
performance will occur. In the alternative, you must ask whether the
expression at issue was intended to one party’s duty conditional and
dependent on some performance by the other party (or on some other
fact or event). If this is the case, then specified performance is a
condition of duty, but no one has promised that the performance will
occur.149 These contract scholars suggest that:
It is not difficult to draw the logical distinction between a
promise that a specified performance will be rendered, and a
provision that makes a specified performance a condition of
the legal duty of a party who promises to render another
performance. The first creates a legal duty in the promisor;
the second limits and postpones a promisor’s duty. Often the
contracting parties do not make this logical distinction and
therefore so word their agreements as to make interpretation
difficult. When such is the case, the court is free to give the
contract the “construction” that appears to be the most
reasonable and just. 150
148
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Based on these definitions, a condition is an action or event that
changes the legal relationship and the duties between the parties to a
contract because it directly affects the duty of performance under the
contract. A condition involves some action that either must occur
before the other party’s performance under the contract is due
(condition precedent) or else discharges the duty of performance that
has already arisen (condition subsequent). 151 On the other hand, a
covenant is a promise from one party under the contract to the other,
which if broken, results in a breach of the contract. The main
difference between a condition and a covenant is that a condition is
an act or event upon which the other party’s duty to perform under
the contract is dependent, while a covenant is merely a promise from
one party to the other that the specified performance will take
place. 152
For example, under the “Source Code License” section of the
MPL, the initial developer and the contributor grant the downstream
user certain rights, but the language of the license makes it clear that
these grants are not necessarily dependent on the downstream user
adhering to any requirements listed in the license. 153 Specifically,
under the “Distribution Obligations” section of the license, the
language indicates that downstream users must include a copy of this
license with every copy of the source code they distribute and that
any modifications that the downstream users contribute must be
available in source code format.154
The language of this license, however, does not make the initial
151

See PERILLO, supra note 145, at 361. For example, under the GPL v.2, when
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See generally HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10.1
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developer’s grant or the contributor’s grant dependent on the
downstream user adhering to these provisions. The use of the word
“must” indicates that there is an obligation on the part of the
downstream user to adhere to these restrictions. The provisions
contained in these grants are not contingent upon the downstream
user’s performance of his obligations under the “Distribution
Obligations” section. This stands in stark contrast to the GPL v.2,
where the drafters made it explicit that further copying, modification,
or distribution of the code is dependent on the downstream user
adhering to the stated requirements. 155
The common law defines covenants and conditions and draws a
distinction in much the same way as do contract law scholars. For
example, New York courts found the distinction between a condition
and a covenant is based on the intent of the parties and the language
used, and aided by reference to all the circumstances surrounding the
parties at the time of the execution of the document. 156 New York
courts have also indicated that certain words such as “upon
condition” and “provided always” are commonly used to create a
condition. 157
Other states have also recognized that the language used in a
contract may determine whether the contract contains a covenant or a
condition. Courts have stated that while the use of the word
“provided” ordinarily denotes a condition, the intention as discerned
from the whole document may override such technical meaning,
creating a covenant instead.158 Thus, while “provided that” normally
denotes a condition, if there is other contradictory language in the
contract, then courts will look at all the language contained in the
contract as a whole to determine the meaning of the words. 159
In California, courts have recognized that a condition is a
qualification and is created by mutual agreement of the parties and is
binding upon both, while a covenant is an agreement of the
155
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covenantor (promisor) only. 160 These courts have further stated that
“the entire context, and not a single clause, will determine the
intention of the parties.” 161 Other jurisdictions have expressly
recognized that “a covenant differs from a condition, both in the
language that constitutes it, and in the consequences that follow from
a breach.” 162 While the breach of a covenant merely gives the
covenantee (promisor) the right to sue, the breach of a condition may
terminate the contract all together.163
Courts have also consistently stated that the intention of the
parties generally determines whether a covenant or condition exists,
and determining the intention of the parties is a matter of legal
interpretation by the courts.164 In cases where the intent of the parties
is ambiguous, courts generally favor an interpretation that finds a
covenant rather than a condition. This is likely because finding a
condition could effectively undermine the existence of the
contract. 165
Using these definitions, the next section will interpret the
language of various open-source licenses.
B. Applying the Definitions of “Condition” and “Covenant” to the
Language of Open-Source Licenses
1. Applying the Jacobsen Reasoning to the GPL v.2

160
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The Preamble to GPL v.2 not only contains an explanation of the
philosophy behind the license, it explicitly states that the license
includes restrictions that prevent users from denying each other the
rights granted under the license. 166 It further states that there are
certain responsibilities for users if the users want to distribute or
modify copies of the software. 167 The Preamble also states that “the
precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution, and
modification follow.” 168 Consequently, the force of the language
contained in the Preamble and the use of the word “condition” make
it clear that the drafters of this license intend the provisions to be
conditions that—if not adhered to—would change the legal
relationship between the parties to the license. Here, the upstream
user would not need to make his source code available unless the
downstream user follows the requirements of the license. The
downstream user would not be able to obtain the source code in the
first place unless the upstream user made the code available subject to
the requirements of the license.
Moreover, the last sentence of the Preamble suggests that the
drafters of GPL v.2 view the following language as conditions of the
license. 169 Thus, as the Federal Circuit found with the Preamble of
the Artistic License in Jacobsen, 170 the Preamble of GPL v.2 also
indicates that the license is intended to create conditions under which
the software can be copied.
As listed throughout the “Terms and Conditions For Copying,
Distribution And Modification” section of the license, the provisions
contained in this section are contingent upon each other and their
application to the user is also contingent upon the user adhering to
terms. This is evidenced by Section 1 of the Terms and Conditions,
which explicitly states that users may copy, distribute, or modify
copies of the source code as they receive it or that they may distribute
a derivative work based on the source code, “provided that” the users
conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy a copyright
166
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notice and disclaimer of warranty and that the users follow the other
requirements listed under subsection 2. 171 In other words, a user’s
ability to copy and distribute copies of the source code verbatim is
contingent upon conspicuous and appropriate publication of the
copyright notice and a disclaimer of warranty. If users do not adhere
to this provision, they do not have the right to copy and distribute
copies of the source code.
Similarly, under Section 3, users may copy and distribute the
program or a work based on the source code under Section 2 in object
code or executable form under Sections 1 and 2 “provided that” they
also do one of the following things listed Section 3. 172
In addition to the “provided that” language contained throughout
GPL v.2, 173 there is strong language contained in Section 4, which
explicitly states that a user may not copy, modify, sublicense, or
distribute the program except as provided under the license and that
any attempt to do otherwise will automatically terminate the user’s
rights under the license. 174 This “automatic termination” provision is
particularly important because it makes it unequivocally clear that
failing to abide by the conditions results in a termination of the
license. Since termination of the license would expose a user to
potential copyright liability if he uses any code licensed under GPL
v.2, this provision is extremely important.
Furthermore, as stated in Section 5, “nothing else” grants the
downstream user the permission to modify or distribute the program
or its derivative work. The upstream user granting permission to
modify or distribute the program is dependent upon the downstream
user abiding by the terms and conditions. Thus, this provision is a
condition subsequent; the downstream user discharges his duty of
performance by adhering to the terms of the license.
Another example of the conditions contained in GPL v.2 appears
in Section 6 of the license. Section 6 states that the recipient of the
program or any derivative work based on the program automatically
receives a license from the original licensor to copy, distribute, or
171
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modify the program “subject to these terms and conditions, which
indicates that receiving the program or the derivative work is
dependent on the listed terms and conditions. 175 Consequently, based
on the Preamble of the license, the use of the words “provided that,”
the inclusion of the automatic termination provision, and the language
contained in sections 5 and 6 of the license, suggest that the
provisions contained in GPL v.2 are conditions and not covenants.
Violating these provisions causes the user to exceed the scope of the
license and exposes the user to copyright liability, as occurred in
Jacobsen.
2. Applying the Jacobsen Reasoning to the GPL v.3
GPL v.3 contains several provisions that are similar in language
and effect to the conditions contained in GPL v.2. For instance, GPL
v.3 contains a Preamble that includes both the philosophy behind the
license and an expression of the drafters’ intention that license users
have certain responsibilities if they choose to distribute copies of
software pursuant to the terms of the license or if they modify copies
of software. 176 GPL v.3 explains the steps that developers that use
this license have taken to protect users’ rights and also states the
protections that the license has implemented to protect developers.177
It further states at the end of the Preamble that “the precise terms
and conditions for copying, distribution, and modification follow,”
and like GPL v.2, it also labels the following section with the caption
“Terms And Conditions,” reflecting the drafters’ intent that the
following provisions are to be interpreted as conditions for use of the
license. 178
Importantly, the language used throughout the GPL v.3 is similar
to the previous version of the license in that it too contains what the
Jacobsen court would consider to be “traditional contract language”
denoting a condition. 179 Specifically, GPL v.3 uses the phrases
175
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“provided that the stated conditions are met,” “provided that,” “solely
under the conditions stated below,” and “provided that you also meet
all of these conditions” (with the four conditions listed below) to refer
to what the drafters of the license clearly intended to be treated as
conditions of the license. 180 While GPL v.3 retains many of the same
conditions contained in GPL v.2, the new version of the license also
contains additional provisions that may or may not be considered
conditions under Jacobsen. Consequently the focus of this section of
this Article will be to examine these new provisions and determine
whether they would constitute conditions under Jacobsen.
The first new provision contained in GPL v.3 is an Anti-DRM
provision contained in Section 3, which states that no covered work
shall be considered an effective technological measure under any
applicable law that fulfills Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
(which in the U.S. would be the DMCA). Under the DMCA, no one
is permitted to circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a protected work.181 The DMCA defines what it
means to circumvent such a technological measure and states what
constitutes an effective technological measure. 182 Section 3 of GPL
v.3 indicates that any software licensed under it that is used to
implement Digital Rights Management (DRM) shall not be deemed
an effective technological measure. 183 Thus, according to the
license’s drafters, if a party implements a DRM system using
software licensed under GPL v.3, that system will not be protected by
the DMCA (since it will not be an effective technological
measure). 184
This provision, however, is unlikely to have the effect the drafters
desired. First, the intent of the drafters seems to run contrary to
federal law, in this case the DMCA. The legal definition of effective
technological measures as stated in the DMCA has nothing to do with
180
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GPL v.3 licensed software. Therefore, a court is unlikely to hold that
a DRM system is not effective simply because it happens to contain
GPL v.3 licensed software. Essentially, courts are unlikely to
interpret this provision in the manner that the drafters intended since
the drafters’ interpretation would contravene the DMCA. What then
will be the effect of this provision?
The likely result of this provision will be that if someone builds a
DRM system that contains GPL v.3 licensed code and the DRM
system that contains the code is an effective technological measure,
then it will not fall under the terms of the license and could
potentially result in a violation of the DMCA as well as copyright
infringement. Because the license states that “no covered work shall
be part of an effective technological measure,” one can argue that
anyone who implements an effective technological measure using
software licensed under GPL v.3 no longer enjoys its protection. This
then begs the question: is this provision a condition or a covenant
under Jacobsen?
Unlike the other provisions of GPL v.3 previously discussed, this
section clearly does not contain traditional contract language denoting
conditions, such as the words “provided that,” nor does this provision
contain any covenants, since there are no promises mentioned
anywhere in the provision. While this provision standing alone is
neither a condition nor a covenant, in the context of the entire license,
a court is likely to interpret it as a condition under Jacobsen. This is
because the termination provision of the license (contained in Section
8) makes it clear that no one may propagate or modify a covered
work except as provided under the language of the license, and any
attempt to do otherwise will result in an automatic termination of the
license. 185 This termination provision makes it evident that a
downstream user’s ability to propagate and modify code covered
under this license is contingent upon following the terms and
condition of the license.
In addition, Section 9 of the license also states that while a user
need not accept this license in order to receive or run a copy of the
program, propagation or modification of any covered work is only
185
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possible under the license. 186 The provision further states that if a
user does not accept this license, such actions will result in copyright
infringement, so that by modifying or propagating a covered work, a
user is implicitly accepting the terms of the license.
Another new provision of GPLv.3 is the patent grant provision
contained in Section 11, which provides a non-exclusive, worldwide,
royalty-free patent license from each contributor to each downstream
user to make, use, sell, offer for sale, import, otherwise run, modify,
and propagate the contents of the contributor’s version. 187 Before
exploring the features of the patent grant provision, it is important to
understand that this provision applies only to the “contributor”
version of the covered work, not any new features added by
downstream users. 188
Under this patent grant, if a user conveys a covered work with
actual knowledge that but for this patent license, conveying the
covered work or a recipient’s use of the covered work would infringe
on a patent, and the user does not make the source of the work
available to others to copy, the user must take one of three remedial
measures listed or else lose the protection of the license. 189 This
provision further states that if a user redistributes a covered work
knowingly relying on the patent license, then he must also shield
downstream users against patent infringement claims or else deprive
himself the benefit of the patent license. 190 Section 10 also references
the patent grant provision and states that asserting a patent
infringement claim terminates the license, as indicated in Section
8. 191
186
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These provisions collectively serve as conditions under Jacobsen
even though they do not include any of the traditional contract
language of conditions. The termination provision of Section 10
functions as a condition. The patent grant provision of Section 11 and
the “no litigation” provision of Section 10 also function as conditions
because when considered in the context of the termination provision
in Section 8, these provisions effectively terminate the rights of a user
who does not adhere to the license terms. 192 The user’s ability to avail
himself to the benefits of the license is therefore dependent on the
user following the terms of these provisions.
The language contained in Section 9 also supports finding
conditions because the language explicitly states that failure to accept
this license results in copyright infringement liability if a user
engages in conduct that is only protected by the license. 193 Therefore,
it is evident that acceptance of all the terms of the license (including
the patent grant) is a condition of the user being able receive the
benefit of the license.
Finally, GPL v.3 also contains a new and explicit provision
addressing violations of the license, as found in Section 8. This
provision not only states that failing to adhere to the terms of this
license will automatically terminate the license, but it also allows for
provisional and permanent reinstatement of the license if the user
ceases the violation. 194 This feature is also likely a condition since it
makes it clear that a user’s ability to benefit from the license is
dependent on his compliance with the license terms. When the user
fails to comply, he loses the license protection; when he is once again
in compliance, he is able to acquire the protection of the license. The
quid-pro-quo nature of the termination provision makes it clear that
this particular provision not only makes the other provisions of the
license function as conditions, but is in and of itself a condition of the
license as well. Consequently, the provisions of GPL v.3, while not
necessarily phrased in the traditional language of conditions,
effectively function as such.
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3. Applying the Jacobsen Reasoning to the Apache License v.2
Unlike the GPL v.2 and the GPL v.3, the Apache License does
not contain a Preamble that establishes the intentions of the drafters
of the license as unequivocally as the Preamble to the GPL v.2 and
GPL v.3. However, like the language of GPL v.2, the language of the
Apache License does contain what the Jacobsen court considers
traditional contract language that denotes the existence of a condition.
The Apache License defines the “Terms And Conditions For Use,
Reproduction, And Distribution,” indicating that the drafters intended
for the provisions to be conditions of the license. 195 The drafters
explicitly labeled these provisions “terms and conditions,” 196 and
most of the provisions contained in the Apache License are
conditions, as illustrated below.
First, the definitions section of the license defines “license” as
referring to the terms and conditions for use, reproduction, and
distribution as defined by Sections 1–9 of the license. 197 Second,
several other provisions use the type of language that the Jacobsen
court would consider to be conditions. For example, Section 2’s
“Grant of Copyright License” makes it clear that each contributor is
granting the user “a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge,
royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare
[d]erivative [w]orks of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense
and distribute the [covered] [w]ork and [d]erivative [w]orks in
[s]ource or [o]bject form.” 198 However, this grant is “subject to the
terms and conditions” of the license. 199 Similar language appears in
Section 3’s “Grant of Patent License.” 200
Moreover, Section 4’s “Redistribution” provision makes it clear
that a user may reproduce and distribute copies of the covered work
or derivative works in any medium and with or without modification
195
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and in source or object code form “provided that” the user “meet the
following conditions,” and then lists the four conditions that users
must follow. 201 Section 4 further states that users may add their own
copyright statements or their own additional or different license terms
and conditions for use, reproduction, or distribution of the user’s
modifications or for any such derivative works as a whole “provided
that” the user’s use, reproduction, and distribution of the work
“otherwise complies with the conditions stated in this license.” 202
Finally, Section 5 provides that unless the user explicitly states
otherwise, any contribution that is submitted for inclusion in the
covered work by the user to the licensor shall be under the terms and
conditions of the license and without any additional terms or
conditions. 203
Based on these examples, it is clear that the provisions of the
Apache License are in fact conditions, though they are not as
unequivocal as those contained in GPL v.3. While the Apache license
may be more permissive than GPL v.2 and does not contain the same
explicit automatic termination provisions found in GPL v.2, its
provisions are as legally binding as conditions as those contained in
GPL v.2.
There are some important distinct features of the Apache License,
however, that affect the condition versus covenant analysis. First,
despite the “Terms And Conditions” label contained in the caption of
the license, not everything that follows the caption is in fact a
condition. As is the case with all open-source licenses, some language
of the Apache License is neither a condition nor a covenant. That is,
certain provisions merely serve as explanations of the drafters’ intent
and views.
For example, Section 8 of the license contains a limitation of
liability provision that essentially states that no contributor under the
license shall be liable to the downstream user for damages arising as a
result of the license or out of the inability to use the work.204 The way
this provision is phrased, it is clear that it is neither a condition nor a
201
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covenant since it neither makes one party’s duty under the license
dependent on another party’s performance or contains a promise of
any kind from one party to another. Rather, this provision merely
states that a user cannot hold a contributor liable for damages. What
is left unclear by the language of this provision is what, if any,
consequences flow from a user trying to hold a contributor liable
under the license. The provision is unclear as to whether the result of
such action would be a dismissal, a termination of the license, or
some other result.
Similarly, the drafters worded Section 3’s “Grant of Patent
License” in such a way that it raises questions as to its implications.
As noted above, it contains the “subject to the terms and conditions”
contract language indicative of conditions. 205 It also contains an
automatic termination provision that states that if a user institutes a
patent litigation action against any entity alleging that the work or
contribution incorporated within it constitutes patent infringement,
then any patent license granted to the user under this provision shall
terminate as of the date of filing of such an action. 206 This provision
begs the question why the other provisions of the license do not
mention automatic termination, as contained in the GPL?
If in fact a user is subject to all the “terms and conditions”
contained in the license, then a user’s failure to abide by any of these
terms and conditions would likely result in a termination of the
license. The right to terminate a license, when tied to a license grant,
would make the “terms and conditions” of the grant “conditions”
under contract law. Therefore, stating in a license that a breach of a
particular provision of the license terminates the license would in fact
lead to the conclusion that the violated term was a condition of the
license. However, this is not expressly stated in the Apache License.
To the contrary, the only provision of the Apache License that even
mentions an automatic termination is the patent grant provision. 207
Thus, the drafting of this provision is confusing because it is
unclear what purpose this automatic termination provision serves. Is
the provision meant to indicate that this is the only provision whose
205
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violation will result in a termination of the license, or is it merely
redundant because violating any term or condition would also result
in termination of the license? Is the provision simply intended to
specify a time element to indicate that the point at which the license
terminates is the date on which the patent litigation action is filed?
Since the language used throughout the license is indicative of the
conditions contained in the license, why did the drafters of this
license fail to mention the automatic termination provision with
respect to these other conditions, as is the case with the GPL? While
it is likely that under Jacobsen the provisions of the Apache License
will be held to be conditions, there are a few aspects of this license
that may not fit as easily into the condition category as do the
provisions of GPL v.2.
4. Applying the Jacobsen Reasoning to the BSD License
The BSD License is significantly shorter than any other opensource license examined in this Article. As a result, applying the
reasoning of Jacobsen is more straightforward. The BSD License
contains one main license grant that states that redistribution and use
in source and binary forms with or without modification are permitted
“provided that” the user meets three conditions: (1) when a user
redistributes source code, the redistributed version must contain the
copyright notice, the list of conditions, and the attached disclaimer;
(2) when a user redistributes code in binary form, he must include a
reproduction of the copyright notice, the list of conditions, and the
attached disclaimer in the materials provided with the distribution;
and (3) the user may not use the name of the organization and the
name of the contributor for endorsement purposes without specific
prior written permission. 208 Thus, based on the use of the words
“provided that” and based on a literal interpretation of Jacobsen, the
BSD License grant provision contains a condition.
Unlike the other licenses examined in this work, the BSD lacks
the additional supporting elements that are present in the GPL or the
Apache License. Specifically, each of those licenses contains either a
208
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Preamble or other language throughout the license that indicates the
specific intent of the drafters to provide the license grant to only those
individuals or entities that abide by the conditions contained in the
license. Those licenses also contain at least one termination clause
that expressly states that a violation of that provision will result in a
termination of the user’s rights under the license. These additional
provisions in the GPL and the Apache License strengthen the
conclusion that these licenses contain conditions rather than
covenants.
Consequently, since the BSD License lacks these additional terms
found in the GPL and the Apache License, there is only a small
chance that another court that declines to follow the reasoning used
by the Federal Circuit in Jacobsen (or which interprets contact law
language differently than the Federal Circuit) will hold that the
language of the BSD License is not a condition.
5. Applying the Jacobsen Reasoning to the Mozilla Public License
Similar to the Apache License, the MPL does not contain a
Preamble. Rather, it contains a list of definitions of terms followed by
subsections, starting with Section 2’s “Source Code License,” which
includes an “Initial Developer Grant” and a “Contributor Grant.”209
The “Initial Developer Grant” expressly states that the user is being
granted a world-wide, royalty-free, non-exclusive license, subject to
third party intellectual property claims, and then lists what the license
grant actually allows the user to do (i.e. use, reproduce, modify,
display, perform, sublicense and distribute the original code or
portions of it with or without modifications and/or as part of a larger
work).210
Under the “Contributor Grant,” the MPL similarly states that
subject to third party intellectual property claims, each contributor is
granting the user a world-wide, royalty free, non-exclusive license
and then lists what the user is permitted to do under the license grant
(use, reproduce, modify, display, perform, sublicense and distribute
the modifications created by the contributor either with or without
209
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modifications as a covered work and/or as part of a larger work,
etc.).211
The drafters worded these provisions in such a way that the
license grants are not dependent on any actions by the user. Unlike
the GPL v.2, GPL v.3, Apache, and BSD licenses discussed above,
these grant provisions are independent of any actions of the user and
are not in any way conditioned upon any action or inaction by the
user. 212 Rather, under these grant provisions the user is merely
obtaining permission outright to engage in the activities that the
grants specifically outline. 213
Thus, while the user may be implicitly promising to adhere to the
license terms by using code that is made available through this
license, the user’s ability to use the code is not contingent upon
following the license terms. The user may face repercussions for not
adhering to the license terms, but the user’s ability to obtain the
license is separate and independent from these obligations. Certain
features of the drafting of the MPL illustrate this point.
First, the language used throughout the license indicates that the
user “must” do certain things (i.e. the user must include a copy of the
license with every copy of source code he distributes), “may” do
certain other things (i.e. the user may include additional documents
offering the additional rights described in Section 3 of the license),
and “may not” do certain things (i.e. the user may not offer or impose
any terms on any source code version that alters or restricts the
applicable version of the license or the recipients’ rights
hereunder). 214
Unlike the previous licenses examined in this Article, however,
the MPL does not contain any terms or provisions that would qualify
as a condition under Jacobsen. To the contrary, the use of the words
“must,” “may,” and “may not” suggest that this license contains
covenants or promises from both the upstream user and the
downstream user. The upstream user’s promises are contained in the
grant provisions of the license while the downstream user’s promises
are contained throughout the license and are implicit in the user’s
211
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decision to avail himself to the code made available to him under this
license. His promises are also evident in every section where the
license states what the downstream user “must” do, “may” do, and
“may not” do.
Under traditional contract law, such language would qualify as
covenants from the upstream user to the downstream user and vice
versa. 215 Furthermore, the language contained in the “Termination”
provision in Section 8 of the license is the traditional contract
language of covenants, as defined by contract law. 216 For example,
Section 8.1 states that if the user fails to comply with the terms of the
license and fails “to cure such breach within 30 days of becoming
aware of the breach,” the license and the rights granted under it will
terminate automatically. 217 This reference to “breach” and “curing the
breach” is evidence of the existence of a covenant since, as contract
scholars have explained, one breaches a covenant and not a
condition. 218 Accordingly, the language of the MPL contains
covenants not conditions, since the grant of rights under the license to
downstream users is not conditioned upon what the downstream user
does or does not do.
The net effect of the existence of these covenants, however, leads
to the same result as if these terms were in fact conditions, because of
the existence of the termination provision in Section 8 of the license.
As mentioned in the discussion of the GPL, the existence of a
termination provision in an open-source license is significant. While
the drafters of an open-source license may phrase the license
215
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language in a manner that does not appear to be very restrictive, they
can easily undo this permissiveness with the inclusion of a
termination clause. This is the case with the MPL. The MPL language
generally makes the license more permissive than the GPL. However,
the MPL (like the GPL) contains a termination clause that actually
undermines its permissiveness. While the covenants contained in the
MPL indicate a certain degree of permissiveness in the license,
Section 8.1’s termination provision completely undermines this
permissiveness.
In Section 8.1, the MPL explicitly states that the license and all
the rights granted under it will automatically terminate if a user fails
to comply with the terms contained in the license and if the user fails
to cure such non-compliance within thirty days of becoming aware of
it. 219 Unlike the rest of the license, this provision seems to function
much like a condition because it effectively tells users that their rights
under the license are actually dependent on following the terms of the
license, and that failure to do so will in fact terminate the license and
possibly expose the user to copyright liability if they use any code
derived from the license. As with the conditions contained in the
GPL, therefore, the termination of the MPL is conditioned upon
something the downstream user does, despite what the other
provisions of the license states.
Consequently, the MPL, while generally viewed as being more
permissive than the GPL and containing covenants and not conditions
unlike the GPL, is on the same legal footing as the GPL with respect
to the enforcement of the provisions of the license. Although the
MPL does not contain the strong conditional language used
consistently throughout the GPL, the one automatic termination
clause that is contained in the MPL ultimately leads to the same
outcome for users who violate its terms. That is to say, a user who
violates the terms of the MPL will have his license terminated, and if
he continues to use any code derived from the license, he will be
exposed to potential copyright liability.
Having applied the reasoning of Jacobsen to a series of licenses,
it is clear that while the reasoning provided by the Federal Circuit
219
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may be helpful in determining whether the language contained in an
open-source license is a condition or a covenant, this analysis is more
complex than merely looking for the traditional contract language
denoting conditions or covenants in the language of each license.
Accordingly, the last section of this Article offers some proposals
for how drafters of an open-source license can write their licenses in
such a way that removes ambiguity regarding the existence of
conditions and covenants.
IV. PROPOSALS
While the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Jacobsen is the only
existing U.S. law interpreting conditions and covenants in opensource licenses, this decision is insufficient for providing a “bright
line rule.” Consequently, there are certain steps that drafters of opensource licenses can take to help make their intentions clear to opensource license users and courts.
First, drafters of open-source licenses should use clear,
unequivocal, and unambiguous language to indicate that they intend
the provisions contained in their license to be interpreted as
conditions. As the Jacobsen court explained, the use of certain
phrases in an open-source license will lead to the conclusion that the
license contains conditions and not covenants based on traditional
contract law principles. 220 These phrases include such words as
“provided that,” 221 “subject to,” “contingent upon,” “dependent
upon,” “unless,” and “conditions” to refer to the provisions contained
in the license. While the appearance of these phrases in a license does
not automatically lead to the conclusion that the license contains a
condition, their appearance certainly strengthens the argument that
the drafters intended these provisions to be interpreted as such.
Second, drafters of open-source licenses who wish to have their
licenses terms interpreted as conditions should make this intention
clear by including a Preamble section in the license. The Preamble
section should state not only the philosophy of the drafter but should
also state his intention in drafting the license. It should specify
220
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whether the terms and provisions are only made available to users
contingent upon their adherence to these terms or whether these terms
are independent provisions of the license. The Preamble should also
state the potential consequences if a user disregards or violates these
provisions.
Third, drafters should incorporate into the license the type of
termination and copyright liability language appearing in the GPL,
where the drafters not only use the traditional contract language for
conditions, but also fortify this use by stating unambiguously that
violating the provisions of the license will result in both termination
of the license and potential exposure to copyright infringement
liability. Such termination clauses, especially when used in
conjunction with the concept of potential copyright infringement
liability, make it clear that these provisions are conditions, which if
violated, terminate the users’ rights under the license. The specific
mention of copyright infringement liability further strengthens an
interpretation in favor of conditions, since violating a covenant will
not terminate the license (it only gives rise to a cause of action for
breach of the license) nor will it expose the user to a potential action
for copyright infringement.
Fourth, drafters of open-source licenses should include a choice
of law clause of the type provided in the MPL. 222 As illustrated in
Jacobsen, state contract law is another tool that courts use in
interpreting the language of an open-source license. Depending on
which state’s law is applied, there is always the possibility that a
court may interpret the same contract language differently in different
jurisdictions. This is really more of a concern when considering
interpretation of contract law by foreign jurisdictions, whose contract
law may be vastly different from contract law in the United States.
By listing in the license itself what state’s law will be applied, the
license gives notice to users that that state’s contract law will dictate
whether the terms contained are conditions or covenants, which in
turn will dictate whether the user is exposing himself to potential
copyright liability by violating the terms of the license.
Finally, since courts will interpret open-source licenses by trying
222
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to discern the intent of the parties and since ambiguous phrasing will
lead to the conclusion that the terms contained are covenants and not
conditions, drafters of open-source license need to decide what it is
they hope to accomplish by drafting the license and how they want
the license to be interpreted. Once they have decided that, they need
to consult experienced licensing and contract attorneys to ensure that
what they have drafted accurately reflects this intention.
If drafters write open-source licenses that leave any doubt
regarding the intention, they are causing both unnecessary litigation
and a potential rise in the proliferation of open-source licenses. So
long as open-source licenses contain ambiguities, there will be a
continued incentive to create new licenses. While drafters can phrase
the language in these new licenses in a way that incorporates both the
Jacobsen reasoning and the proposals suggested above, there is still
the problem that these new licenses will not apply retroactively to
code that has already been made available under a previous version or
another open-source license.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Several policy concerns arise when drafting and interpreting
open-source licenses. Allowing drafters to manipulate the distinction
between conditions and covenants through linguistic gymnastics (in
order to unfairly extend copyright liability) may simply be the wrong
outcome as a matter of public policy. Courts have held that there are
limits to the notion of freedom of contract, 223 and the struggle
between freedom of contract and the need to place limits on the
freedom continues, as evidenced by Supreme Court jurisprudence
surrounding the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. 224
223
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Scholars have offered suggestions for drawing a principled
distinction between conditions and covenants. For example, one view
is that only conditions that touch on the exclusive rights under
copyright should qualify as license conditions. 225 The benefit of this
suggestion is that it limits the power of copyright licensors. 226
Another view is that a license condition is any condition that the
parties insert in the license grant. This is based on the idea that the
parties choose the label themselves, rather than allowing a court to
decide the label for them. 227 The benefit of this view is that it is
consistent both with the Federal Circuit’s view in Jacobsen 228 and
with the notion of freedom of contract.229 The drawback is that it may
give copyright licensors too much power. 230
As a whole, the latter view reflects the better approach for several
reasons. As mentioned above, this view is consistent with both the
reasoning in Jacobsen as well as the notion of freedom of contract. It
also forces drafters of open-source licenses to be more careful in how
they draft their licenses, which in turn allows for more clarity in the
licenses themselves. Moreover, allowing the parties to choose
whether the terms are conditions or covenants encourages parties to
enter into licenses, which in turn promotes innovation. 231
In the case of open-source licenses, this is especially true since
open-source licenses allow developers to develop and improve
software more quickly and allow people to obtain the benefit from the
talent and expertise of programmers whose work they may not
otherwise be able to access. Moreover, licensing law already has
certain boundaries in place to protect against the expansion of
copyright licensing abuses. For instance, canons of contract
construction and contract formation (e.g., unconscionability),
unconstitutional because in enacting that law, Congress has exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause).
225
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 47, at 354.
226
Id. at 355.
227
Id. at 356.
228
See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (where the court noted that the
use of a license contract allows copyright holders to control what can be done with
their works).
229
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 47, at 356.
230
See id.
231
Id. at 357.
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consumer protection laws, the misuse doctrine, antitrust law, and
general public policy concerns all serve as boundaries on licenses. 232
Consequently, any policy concerns surrounding parties’ choosing to
insert conditions or covenants in their licenses are adequately
addressed by other legal doctrines outside of licensing law. As
suggested by the Jacobsen opinion, context maters. 233 In Jacobsen,
the Federal Circuit suggests that the issue is one of contract
interpretation. 234 That is, the correct approach is to look at the
contract as a whole and determine what the individual phrases mean
in the larger context of the contract as a whole.
Another policy consideration that arises when interpreting opensource licenses is the lack of understanding that often exists on the
part of those who use software that has been distributed under the
terms of an open-source license. Many individuals who use code
derived from open-source code do not truly understand the terms and
provisions contained in the license that enables them to use that code.
Moreover, these individuals do not understand the legal consequences
that flow from using open-source code. Thus, perhaps these
individuals should not be held accountable for violating such
provisions. However, there is a strong opposition that believes
regardless of their lack of knowledge, individuals who choose to use
source code made available under a specific open-source license are
binding themselves to those provisions. The rationale here is that
there are certain risks inherently involved when one uses open-source
code or when one makes code available via an open-source license.
The only thing that is evident regarding open-source license
interpretation is the lack of clarity that actually exists in this area of
law. Consequently, programmers, attorneys, and users of open-source
code must read the terms of each license carefully before availing
themselves to its benefits.

232

See id. at 359.
See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382 n.5 (citing to the example of author
attribution and explains that the failure to provide attribution only triggers
copyright infringement if the license so provides).
234
See id. at 1381.
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CONCLUSION
While many in the open-source community are pleased that the
Federal Circuit has weighed in on the issue of the interpretation of
open-source licenses in its decision in Jacobsen, it is clear that the
Jacobsen decision is merely a guidepost, not a source of bright line
rules for how to interpret conditions and covenants in open-source
licenses. Consequently, courts and scholars are still left to wonder
exactly how to interpret the language of an open-source license to
draw this distinction. The interpretations of the open-source licenses
contained in this Article are a starting point in this study.
Given the broad variation among open-source licenses, there is
still room for debate as to what the provisions in these licenses mean.
The ultimate answer to this question will be found in forthcoming
judicial decisions following litigation of more open-source licenses.
Until then, open-source scholars, attorneys, and the members of the
open-source community must scrutinize and parse in great detail
every phrase contained in these licenses to ascertain whether they
adhere to the reasoning of Jacobsen. 235
PRACTICE POINTERS


When drafting an open-source license, the license drafter should
use clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous language to indicate his
intention that the provisions contained in the license should be
interpreted as conditions. When possible, use the traditional
contract language indicating conditions, which includes phrases
such as “provided that,” “subject to,” “conditioned upon,”
“dependent upon,” “unless,” and “conditions.”



Include a preamble in the license, stating both the philosophy of
the drafter and his intention in drafting the license. The preamble
should specify whether the terms and conditions contained in the
license are available to users contingent upon users’ adherence to
these terms and conditions, or whether these terms and conditions
are independent provisions of the license. The preamble should
also state the potential consequences for users who disregard or
235

See id. at 1380-82.
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violate these provisions.


The license drafter should include a termination clause as well as
language stating that violating the provisions of the license will
result in both termination of the license and potential exposure to
copyright infringement liability.



The drafter should include a choice of law clause in the license,
indicating which jurisdiction’s law will govern in the event of
litigation.



The license drafter should decide beforehand what he hopes to
accomplish by drafting the license and how he wants the license
to be interpreted. After the drafter has decided these matters
(ideally before starting the drafting process), he should then
consult an experienced licensing and contract attorney to ensure
that what is drafted accurately reflects the drafter’s intention.

